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ABSTRACT 
In recent years a number of disaffected persons have challenged in the Courts decisions made 
by sports associations. Traditionally the basis of challenge has been on the grounds of 
breach of contract. Latterly the preferred basis of challenge has been by way of judicial 
review. This paper examines the way in which judicial review has been used to impugn 
decisions made by sports associations. The exact scope of judicial review within this area 
remains unclear. This paper compares and contrasts the relevant law in New Zealand, 
England and other common law jurisdictions. In New Zealand the Courts seem to be taking 
a wider approach than other jurisdictions. However the amenability of decisions made by 
sports administrators to judicial review has yet to be fully tested in the Court of Appeal. This 
paper argues that a clear articulation of the law is required. Drawing on the cases this 
paper contends that judicial review will be available as an instrument to supervise decisions 
made by sports associations where the decision involves a sufficient public element. It is 
argued that the public importance of sport will in itself be a factor in determining whether 
there is a sufficient public element. The paper argues that the commercialisation of sport and 
sports associations will result in an even greater need for the supervision by the Courts of 
decisions made in the sporting arena. Lastly the paper asks whether there is a need for 
legislative reform in order to bring the decisions of sports associations under the supervision 
of the Courts. The paper examines the arguments for and against the intetference of Courts 
in decisions made by sports associations and argues that judicial review should be available 
as an instrument of supervision. The paper concludes that legislative reform is not necessary 
as the common law is sufficiently elastic to meet the challenge. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (including contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 16,500 words. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sport contributes a great deal to the lifestyle which New Zealanders enjoy . In 
addition the sports industry contributes in a significant way to the national economy 
by providing employment and generating revenue . The importance of sport to both 
society and the economy requires that it have effective , efficient and fair mechanisms 
for controlling its administration. This paper examines the way in which judicial 
review has been used to supervise the administration of sport in New Zealand. A 
comparison is made with other jurisdictions. A clear articulation of the law is called 
for. 
Before exammmg the intervention of judicial review m the decisions of sports 
associations it is first necessary to clarify what is meant by both sport and sports 
association. No definition is attempted and much of the discussion will be relevant 
to other voluntary associations. However as it is argued that the element of sport will 
be a factor indicating that a particular decision made by an ostensibly private body 
has a sufficient public element, the essential elements of sport are outlined . Such an 
undertaking will assist in determining whether a particular sphere of activity may be 
regarded as a sport. In addition this paper focuses on administrative action of 
voluntary associations rather than administration of sport by individuals or 
government therefore a definition of an association is attempted . As this paper is 
concerned with judicial review it will also be necessary to clarify what is meant by 
judicial review. This is carried out in Part II of the paper. 
Traditionally sports associations have been regarded as domestic or private bodies 
which fall outside the sphere of government. 1 The amenability of administrative 
action of sports associations to judicial review remains uncertain in New Zealand. 
At first sight it would appear that judicial review is available without qualification in 
order to impugn decisions of sports associations which are incorporated . This would 
in part appear to be a misapplication of Section 4 of the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972. This approach may not stand up to the scrutiny of the Court of Appeal. 
1 Sir William Wade Administrative Law (7ed Clarendon Press, Ox fo rd, 1994) 660 . 
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Although there are other grounds for intervention which enable Courts to impugn 
decisions of sports associations the preferred option by plaintiffs in New Zealand has 
been to apply under the ground of judicial review. These issues are canvassed in 
Part III. 
The approach of the New Zealand courts is compared and contrasted with the 
approach in the English Courts. Reference is also made to other common law 
jurisdictions. Outside New Zealand the general consensus is that sports associations 
are private bodies which should not have their decisions impugned by an instrument 
of law used for controlling abuses and excesses of Government. However this view 
is by no means unqualified and the door remains open in each jurisdiction examined. 
This lack of unanimity illustrates the conflict between the desirability that private 
associations free from interference by the Courts and the recognition of the immense 
power which some voluntary bodies including sports associations wield in society. 
Part IV examines the case law and attempts to provide some indication of the types 
of sports association and types of decision which may be amenable to judicial review. 
Commercial interests and professionalism are playing an increasing role and are 
having an increasing effect on the administration of sports associations. 2 Typically 
major sports now operate on two levels. At the higher level, sport is a form of 
public commercial entertainment. At the lower level, that is the club or grassroots 
level, it operates to provide a range of civic amenities including personal enjoyment, 
health and education to the participants. 3 Part V of this paper argues that in order 
to protect sports persons and subordinate sports associations in the increasingly 
commercial world of sport it will be more necessary than ever for participants to have 
recourse to judicial review. 
In Part IV the paper asks whether legislative reform is necessary in order to control 
arbitrary power wielded by sports associations. The paper examines the arguments 
2 PW David "Sport and the Law - a New Field for Players?" [1992] Z Recent Law Review 80. 
3 Edward Grayson Sport and the Law (7ed Butterworths & Co Publishers Ltd, London 1994) viii, xlix. 
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for and against the intervention of judicial review m the decisions of sports 
associations and concludes that on balance the availability of judicial review to 
affected participants is desirable in order to provide effective and fair mechanisms of 
control. The paper concludes that legislative reform is not required but that a wide 
view should be taken by the Courts in relation to the scope of judicial review . It calls 
for an approach which recognises that public power can reside in bodies other than 
government organisations and concludes that any regulatory power with a sufficient 
public element should in principle be reviewable. 4 
II. SPORTS ASSOCIATIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. What is a Sports Association? 
1. The character of sport 
There is no doubt that sport plays an important and perhaps essential role in New 
Zealand Society . In 1990 47 % of all New Zealanders belonged to at least one sport , 
fitness or leisure club and 30 % of all New Zealanders regularly spent their leisure 
time in voluntary support roles for sport , fitness and leisure activities. In 1992 sport 
and leisure generated $4 .5 million a day in business and supported over 22 ,000 jobs.
5 
As John Hargreaves, author of a sociological study on sports , points out societies 
would be unquestionably different places in the absence of organised sport. 
6 
Edward Grayson, a sports law commentator, has concluded that sport defies 
definition . 7 Much of the argument in this paper will equally apply to other voluntary 
associations involving other spheres of activity such as religion , education, artistic and 
4 Juli a Black "Constitutionalising Self Regulation?" [1996] 59 MLR 24. 
5 New Zealand Official Year Book 95 (98ed , Stati stics New Zea land , 1995) 301 . 
6 John Hargreaves Sport, Power and Culture (Poli ty Press , Cambridge , 1986) 14. 
7 Above n 3. 
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cultural activities. As this paper argues that the very nature of sport will itself be a 
contributing factor in deciding whether a particular decision is amenable to judicial 
review, the characteristics of sport must be identified if not defined. The fact that a 
particular decision of a voluntary association does not involve sport will not of course 
disqualify it from the purview of judicial review. Each case will depend upon its 
particular circumstances but the fact that the decision involves sport will be one factor 
pointing towards its public nature. 
Recently Parliament was required to formulate a definition of sport in order to 
institute sports betting legislation. Section 99I of the Racing Amendment Act 1995 
provides that "' sport' means any lawful organised game, competition, or event 
involving human competitors conducted pursuant to rules which are under the control 
of a national or international sports organisation". The above definition illustrates the 
difficulty in defining sport. The definition is at once too wide and too narrow. The 
definition leaves out the crucial physical element of sport and applies only to those 
sports under the control of a national sports organisation. In addition the definition 
excludes greyhound racing which does not involve human competitors but is 
controlled by the Racing Act, albeit in a different part of the Act. 
Instead of adopting a definition of sport the writer intends to adopt the characteristics 
identified by Hargreaves which in his view are common to all sports. 
8 All sports 
embody an element of play, they are highly formalised and m many cases are 
governed by elaborate codes or statutes , they involve some element of contest 
between participants, they constitute a form of popular theatre, they involve ritual 
practices characterised by rule governed behaviour of a symbolic character and lastly, 
they require a physical input. The primary focus of sports is on the body and its 
attributes. It is noted that such a definition leaves out those forms of physical activity 
where there is a struggle with one self such as mountain climbing, hunting or fishing . 
These activities have the crucial physical element but lack the rules and structure of 
competition which equalise conditions for participants and require fair play. The 
8 Above n 6 , 10-12. 
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abovementioned characteristics are present to varying degrees in all the major 
organised sports in New Zealand. It is these elements which distinguish sports from 
other spheres of activity and give it a special character. 
2. What is an association? 
There are over fifty national associations which are members of the New Zealand 
Assembly for Sport. Those associations claim a collective membership of over 1.5 
million. 9 There are a number of bodies which are involved with the administration 
of sport. Such bodies include government departments, local authorities , schools, 
clubs, incorporated and unincorporated associations and companies limited by shares. 
This paper is concerned with voluntary, self-regulating associations . Therefore 
government departments, local authorities and schools will fall outside the purview 
of this paper. So also would statutory bodies established to administer or foster 
sports. For instance the Hillary Commission which was established under the Sport, 
Fitness and Leisure Act 1987 with a purpose of improving the quality of life of New 
Zealanders by enabling them, inter alia, to participate and achieve in sport would not 
qualify as a sports association. On the other hand the New Zealand Racing 
Conference which is an unincorporated body made up of racing club members and 
the New Zealand Rugby Football Union which is an incorporated body made up of 
provincial rugby union members would qualify as a sports association. 
The definition proposed by Black for self-regulatory associations is useful. 10 She 
describes an association as a group of persons or bodies , acting together, performing 
a regulatory function in respect of themselves and others who accept their authority. 
The writer would add to this definition that acceptance may not be given freely and 
there may be others outside the collective who are affected by the regulations made 
by the association. As the Master of the Rolls Lord Donaldson pointed out in R v 
Takeover Panel, exp Datafin Plc, self-regulation "Can connote a system whereby a 
9 Above n 5 , 301. 
IO Above n 4 , 27 . 
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group of people acting, in concert, use their collective power to force themselves and 
others to comply with a code of conduct of their own devising. "11 
The touchstone is voluntary collective self-regulation. Such a guide will exclude 
government regulation and individual self-regulation. Of course the government may 
be indirectly involved in the regulation of any particular association. A sports 
association will be any such body which regulates or administers sport. For the 
purposes of this paper it will include bodies such a tribunals and committees formed 
under the rules of the associations. 
Less typically sports associations may be unincorporated societies or limited liability 
companies. An example of the former is the Auckland Warriors Limited and the 
latter would be the New Zealand Racing Conference. In each case the association 
will formulate rules and regulations for governing itself, imposing conditions of 
membership and discipline and for controlling the administration of the particular 
sport. Such control may also include formulating the rules under which the sport 
itself is to be played. 
B. Judicial Review 
The law has intervened in the decisions of governing bodies of sports in a number of 
ways. For instance by way of an action in defamation, unreasonable restraint of trade 
or unreasonable interference with a person's right to work, and by way of breach of 
express and implied terms in a contract between the parties. 12 This paper is 
concerned with judicial intervention by way of the prerogative writs and under 
Section 4 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. Namely those principles of 
administrative law which are designed to provide a basic protection for individuals 
and prevent those exercising public functions from abusing their powers to the 
11 [1987] l QB 815 , 826 . 
12 Above n 3, 279-309. 
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disadvantage of the public . 13 Lord Templeman has said: "Judicial review involves 
interference by the Court with a decision made by a person or body empowered by 
Parliament or the governing law to reach that decision in the public interest" 
(emphasis added). 14 The principles upon which the Court is permitted to intervene 
in a decision under the principles of judicial review are set forth in the classic dictum 
of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil 
Service. 15 
The general grounds for challenge are under illegality , procedural impropriety or 
unfairness, and irrationality or unreasonableness. 16 Judicial review is not an appeal 
from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. 17 By 
illegality is meant that a decision maker must not fall into legal error and act outside 
the scope of his or her powers. The potential will arise for a sports administrator to 
fall into legal error when exercising powers under the association ' s rules or 
constitution. In addition the decision maker must not exercise his or her decision for 
an improper purpose outside the scope of the governing law. A decision maker must 
take into account certain relevant matters and must not take into account certain 
irrelevant matters. 18 The decision maker must not rigidly apply a pre-determined 
policy without regard to the particular merits of the case 19 or invalidly delegate a 
power to another person. 20 The above list is not exhaustive but illustrates that sports 
administrators acting under the powers of a sports association's rules or constitution 
13 de Smith , Woolf and Jowell , Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Sect , Sweet & Maxwe ll , London, 
1995), 3 . 
14 Merrn,y Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1 994] 2 NZLR 385, 388 . 
15 [1984] 3 All ER 935 , 950 , 951 . 
16 Above n 15 , see also Webster v Auckland Harbour Board [1 987] 2 NZLR 129. 
17 Chief Constable of th e North Wales Police v Evans [1 982] 3 All ER 141 , 155. 
18 Fiord/and Venison Ltd v Minister of Agriculture [1 978] 2 NZLR 341 . 
19 British 0"1.-ygen Ltd v Board of Trade [1971] AC 6 10 . 
20 Hawkes Bay Raw Milk Producers' Co-operative v New Zealand Milk Board [196 1] NZLR 2 18. 
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must take care to understand correctly the law that regulates his or her decision 
making power. Such decisions will include those made in the course of disciplinary 
proceedings . 
The terms unreasonableness and irrationality are broader concepts and focus on the 
decision or the outcome itself rather than the process by which the decision was 
reached. They apply to a decision that no reasonable decision maker could have 
made in the circumstances . 21 This ground of review comes the closest to 
considering the merits of a decision. Often where a Court finds that a decision maker 
has acted unreasonably there will be one or more breaches of one of the other 
grounds for review .22 Given the nature of the ground it is most likely to be used 
by persons affected under disciplinary proceedings but may also apply to unreasonable 
rules. 
The last general ground for review is procedural impropriety or unfairness. This 
ground covers the requirements of natural justice and includes the concept of 
legitimate expectation. There are two basic requirements of natural justice or 
fairness, namely the duty to inform a person sufficiently and to allow them an 
opportunity to be heard and the rule against bias. 23 Once again an application for 
review on the grounds of a breach of natural justice are most likely to arise in relation 
to decisions made by sports associations where disciplinary proceedings are involved. 
However the principles may well arise where for instance a national body makes an 
administrative decision concerning a member club or members generally . 
In addition the concept of legitimate expectation and duties of consultation arising out 
of that expectation also form part of the ground of procedural impropriety or fairness . 
A legitimate expectation will most likely arise where the decision maker has given 
2 1 Chiu v Minister of Immigration [1994) 2 NZLR 541. 
22 For example see above n 21 , 550 . 
23 Ridge v Baldwin [19641 AC 40 , 75 , Auckland Casino Ltd v Casino Control Authority [1995] I NZLR 142. 
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some assurance to the affected person that they will be treated in a certain way24 or 
it may arise from a practise in the administration of the governing law. 25 The 
legitimate expectation involves a right to be heard and consulted. It would typically 
arise where a member club or a member generally expects to be treated in a particular 
way. It is likely to arise in a licensing type situation where the affected individual 
may be excluded or denied participation in the particular sport. 
As Beloff has pointed out the general grounds for review set out in Council of Civil 
Service Unions was never intended to be exhaustive. 26 There is authority for the 
proposition that a decision based on a mistake of fact may be grounds for review. 27 
The availability of mistake of fact as a ground for review will have a significant 
impact on the disciplinary decisions of sports associations where , for instance, 
administrative findings of fact are made in relation to foul play and other live action 
during a sporting event. 
Another possible ground for review 1s based on the European principle of 
proportionality . The doctrine of proportionality is directed towards maintaining a 
proper balance between any adverse effects which an administrative body ' s decision 
may have on the rights , liberties , or interests of persons and the purpose which the 
decision pursues . Alternatively the reviewing authority adopts the course that where 
the particular objective can be achieved by more than one available means, the least 
harmful means should be adopted . 28 The principle of proportionality has yet to be 
accepted by the commonwealth jurisdictions but may well shade into the principle of 
24 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2AC 629. 
15 AMP Society v Waitemata Harbour Maritime Planning Authority [1982] 2 NZLR 448. 
26 Michael J Beloff "Judicial Rev iew - 2001 : A Prophetic Odyssey" [1995] 58 MLR 143, 150. 
27 Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130, 146, 147, Cooke J sa id in ob iter that mistake 
of fac t was a valid ground of review. In Devonport Borough Council v Local Government Commission [ I 989] 2 
NZLR 203 the Court of Appeal accepted that mistake of fact was a ground fo r judicial review. 
28 R v lmervention Board fo r Agrirnltural Produce, ex p ED & F Mann Neta-Mulzle Josef Bergmen v Grosw-
Farm Case 114/76 [1977] ECR 12 11 . 
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unreasonableness. 29 This principle if adopted would have significant consequences 
to decisions made by sports associations where sanctions or other orders are imposed, 
such as fines, suspensions and disqualifications. 
The principles of judicial review outlined above are not mutually exclusive. Lord 
Donaldson MR has said: 
The reality is that judicial review is a jurisdiction which has been developed and 
is still being developed by the Judges. It has many strands and more will be 
added, but they are and will always be closely interwoven. But however the 
cloth emerges from the loom, it must never be forgotten that it is a supervisory 
and not an appellate jurisdiction. 30 
As can be seen above the availability of judicial review as a tool to impugn decisions 
made by sports associations will have far reaching consequences to the way they make 
their decisions. It should however be borne in mind that although a decision maker 
may come within the ambit of judicial review the remedies are discretionary and the 
Court can not impose its view of the merits of a decision upon the decision maker. 
III. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PLAY 
A. Public Policy Requirements of Natural Justice and Fairness 
1. Implied terms in the rules of the association 
Typically decisions of sports associations will involve disputes between sports bodies 
and their members including disciplinary decisions, constitutional decisions involving 
29 See Isaac v Minister of Consumer Affairs [1990] 2NZLR 606, 636 where Tipping J said that the principal 
of proportionality was a criteria upon which the Court could consider whether a decision was unreasonable, see also 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department: exp Brine/ [ 1991] l AC 696, where the House of Lords considered 
that the principle could be of relevance in establishing unreasonableness. The House was divided as to whether it 
was a separate ground for review. 
30 Above n 29 reference to Brine/. 
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administrative action under the rules and bylaws of the association and membership 
or registration matters. The law will intervene where there is a contract between the 
decision-maker and the person seeking to challenge the decision. A member will 
have enforceable rights in contract brought about by his or her membership of a 
voluntary association, including the right that the association ' s affairs will be 
conducted in accordance with the association's rules .31 
The Courts will also intervene by implying into the rules of voluntary associations the 
rules of natural justice. For example in Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union
32 
the plaintiff sought inter alia declarations that a decision of a trade union 's district 
committee not to approve him for election was made in disregard of the rules of 
natural justice and was void. The Court of Appeal implied in to the contract of 
membership between the parties a duty to act fairly on grounds of public policy . 
That duty to act fairly involved informing the member of the charge and giving the 
member an opportunity to be heard. 
Lord Denning MR recognised that some domestic bodies were set up by powerful 
associations which could control a person' s livelihood by expelling them as a member 
or refusing them membership or the grant of a licence. He likened rules of such 
associations to a legislative code . He conceded that the Courts could not grant the 
prerogative writs such as certiorari and mandamus against domestic bodies but 
concluded they could grant declarations and injunctions which he stated were the 
modern machinery for enforcing administrative Jaw. 33 
Similarly in Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v Football Association Ltd
34 the 
question arose as to whether a rule of the Football Association which excluded legal 
3 1 Turner v Pickering [1976] 1 NZLR 129, 141 , see generally Bouzaid v llorowhenua Indoor Bowls Centre 
[1964] NZLR 197 ,193 . 
32 [1971] 2 QB 175. 
33 Above n 32, 190. 
34 [1971] I Ch 591. 
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representation at an appeal hearing was valid. Although the Court of Appeal found 
that the rule was valid provided it left open the possibility of legal representation in 
an exceptional case, the Court of Appeal agreed it could hold a rule of the Football 
Association to be invalid on the grounds that it was contrary to public policy even 
though it was contained in a contract. 35 
The principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in Enderby and Breen will be limited 
to situations where the affected person is a member of the relevant sports association. 
Also the grounds for intervention under implied contractual terms may be narrower 
than the grounds for intervention under judicial review. Intervention has traditionally 
been on the grounds of illegality and procedural impropriety . Members in a 
contractual relationship with the association will have protection where it and bodies 
constituted under its rules act outside the scope of their powers or act unfairly . In 
addition Fisher J commented in Waitakere City Council v Waitemata Electricity 
Shareholders Society Inc36 that it might be possible for a member of an association 
to challenge an amendment to the association's rules on the basis of a breach of an 
implied term similar to a duty to act reasonably . In addition, as well as remedies of 
injunction and declaration the wronged party will also have a claim in damages . It 
is however unlikely that the grounds for intervention under contract will be as wide 
as those for judicial review . 
2. Where no contractual relationship exists 
Where there is no contractual relationship between the affected person and the sports 
association in question there is another ground for intervention besides judicial 
review. In Nagle v Feilden37 the plaintiff was a woman who had trained race horses 
35 Above n 34 , 606 . See also Hollioake v West Australian Cricket Association [1994] 11 LAR 423, principles 
of natural justice held to apply to a committee of inquiry , Bryne v Auckland Irish Society Inc [ 1979) l NZLR 35 l , 
principles of natural justi ce held to apply to rules of society . 
36 Unreported , 18 March 1996 , High Court , Auckland Reg istry, Ml544/95, 14, 15 . 
37 I 1966) 2QB 633 . 
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for many years. She applied to the Jockey Club for a trainers licence but was 
refused. It was the practice of the stewards of the Jockey Club to refuse to grant a 
trainers licence to a woman. The plaintiff brought an action against the Jockey Club 
claiming, inter alia, a declaration that the practice of the stewards in refusing a 
trainers licence to any woman was void as against public policy and for an injunction 
ordering the stewards to grant her a licence. The trial judge struck out the claim on 
the basis that it disclosed no cause of action as there was no contractual relationship 
between the parties. 
Lord Denning MR delivered the leading judgment of the Court. He conceded that 
a person who was refused membership of a social club would have no cause of 
action. However he held that the Jockey Club was an association which exercised a 
virtual monopoly on an important field of human activity. His Lordship noted that 
the club's refusal to grant a licence could put a person out of business. The refusal 
concerned a person ' s right to work which could be likened to a property right. He 
held that where an association rejects a person arbitrarily or capriciously then there 
would be jurisdiction to grant a declaration and injunction in order to protect those 
rights. 
Nagle has been followed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Stininato v Auckland 
Boxing Association Inc38 where the Boxing Association refused the applicant's 
application for a licence to box on the grounds of alleged past misconduct. No 
opportunity was given to the applicant to answer the charges. The Court of Appeal 
held that the refusal by the Boxing Association to grant the applicant a professional 
boxers licence but without giving him an opportunity of answering the charge could 
be capable of being regarded as an unreasonable restraint of trade and as a breach of 
natural justice. The Court of Appeal held the doctrine could apply to an act or a 
constituent body as well as to a rule of the association. 
39 
38 [1978) 1 NZLR I. 
39 Above n 38 , 8. 
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Cooke J said that the principle which extends the jurisdiction of the Courts over 
vocational associations is not dependent on technicalities of contract or property . He 
concluded that the need to mould public policy to protect the right to work and the 
traditional concern of the common law to ensure that a man is not condemned without 
an opportunity of being heard would provide strong reasons for holding that a Court 
has a power to review decisions of a sports association. He concluded remedies of 
declaration and injunction would be available to declare past decisions of sports 
associations invalid and compel proper consideration of pending applications where 
the person' s right to work is affected .40 Richmond P and Woodhouse J expressed 
similar sentiments . The Court applied the reasoning in Breen and Nagle in reaching 
their conclusion and noted that the boxing association had monopolistic powers which 
virtually excluded the professional boxers ' right to work. 
Pannick has commented that unreasonable restraint of trade in this context appears to 
be treated as a tort by the Courts .4 1 However in Stininato it seems clear that the 
Court of Appeal saw the doctrine as being founded in administrative law . 
42 As such 
it would appear to be an ad hoe public law remedy and the judgment indicates that 
the remedy goes beyond the interference of the right to work to a general public 
policy that voluntary associations must act fairly . 
43 
40 See also Blackler v New Zealand Rugby Football l eague Inc [1 968) NZ LR 547 , where the Court of Appea l 
he ld that the rule under which the League ac ted to deny the plaintiff c learance was an unreaso nable restra int of trade 
and therefore void as between the plainti ff and the League eve n though there was no contractual re lationship be tween 
the parties. 
41 David Pannick "What is a public authori ty fo r the purposes of Judic ial Rev iew?" in J L Jowe ll and D Oli ver 
(Eds) New Directions in Judicial Review (Steve ns & Sons, London, 1988) 23, 30 . 
42 Above n 38, 29 . 
43 Fo r an example of how judic ial rev iew and the principle of unreasonable interfe rence with the right to wo rk 
can operate in identica l c ircumstances see Power v New Zealand Football Association Inc, unreported , 16 M arch 
1987, High Court , Auckland Reg istry, CP283/87 and Stevenage Borough Football Club Ltd v The Football league 
Ltd T imes Law Reports, I August 1996 . 
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B. Judicial Review Under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 and the Prerogative 
Writs 
No examination of the way judicial review has been used as an instrument to question 
the decisions of sports associations can be separated from a critical analysis of the 
scope of judicial review. The two matters are inextricably interwoven. The scope 
of judicial review in the sphere of sports provides the main topic for debate in the 
common law jurisdictions outside New Zealand. The ready availability of judicial 
review as a tool for impugning decisions made by sports administrators is unique to 
New Zealand. In the racing industry members challenge by way of judicial review 
decisions of the New Zealand Racing Conference and New Zealand Trotting 
Conference and their constituent clubs and committees on a fairly regular basis. The 
amenability of administrative action to judicial review amongst the racing clubs can 
to some extent be explained by the level of government intervention under the Racing 
Act 1971. More controversial is a willingness of the High Court to examine 
decisions of sports associations by way of judicial review where there is no apparent 
government intervention. 
The grounds upon which judicial review will be available have been discussed 
above . 44 Whether a particular body is in fact amenable to judicial review is another 
question. The point is illustrated in the decision of Simpson v NZ Racing 
Conference, 45 where the plaintiff horse trainer faced two charges under the rules of 
racing after the horse he had trained returned a positive test for a prohibited drug . 
The first disciplinary body , the district committee, imposed a fine . On an appeal 
brought on behalf of the executive committee of the New Zealand Racing Conference 
the Appeal Judges found that the fine imposed was an inadequate penalty and 
substituted a term of disqualification for twelve months. The plaintiff brought an 
action by way of judicial review under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 against 
the decision of the Appeal Judges on grounds of procedural impropriety and illegality . 
44 Above, Part II. 
45 Unreported , 24 June 1980, High Court , Wellington Registry, A531/79. 
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Although the plaintiff ultimately failed, the Court finding that the appeal judges were 
clearly acting within their jurisdiction and that there was no miscarriage of justice or 
unfairness in their decision, an important procedural point was raised by the 
defendants. They contended that the nature of the decision did not fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Act on the grounds that the District Committee and the appeal 
judges had not executed a statutory power under Section 4 of the Act. Section 4(1) 
provides: 
On an application ... for review, the [High Court] may, notwithstanding any right of 
appeal possessed by the applicant in relation to the subject-matter of the application, 
by order grant, in relation to the exercise, refusal to exercise, or proposed or 
purported exercise by any person of a statutory power, any relief that the applicant 
would be entitled to, in any one or more of the proceedings for a writ or order of or 
in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari or for a declaration or 
injunction, against that person in any such proceedings (emphasis added). 
Section 3 of the Act provides: 
"statutory power" means a power ... to exercise a statutory power of decision ... 
Section 3 defines: 
"statutory power of decision" as a power or right conferred by or under any Act[, or 
by or under the constitution or other instrument of incorporation, rules, or bylaws of 
any body corporate, to make a decision deciding or prescribing or affecting] 
-(a) the rights powers, privileges, immunities, duties, or liabilities of any 
person; 
(b) the eligibility of any person to receive, or to continue to receive a benefit 
or licence, whether he is legally entitled to it or not. 
The point arose in Simpson because the New Zealand Racing Conference was an 
unincorporated society. Jeffries J, citing an earlier Royal Commission set up to 
investigate and report on horse racing in New Zealand, noted that the Racing 
Conference was in constitution an association of racing clubs. It was a not a statutory 
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body and had no statutory authority or powers. It derived its authority solely from 
the rules of racing which operated through their contractual force , namely that all 
those who participated in racing agreed to be bound by the rules. 46 
As the New Zealand Racing Conference was an unincorporated society the Appeal 
Judge ' s decision did not come within that part of the definition of a statutory power 
or statutory power of decision which specifically refers to a power or a right under 
the rules of "any body corporate". Jeffries J examined the Racing Act 1971 and held 
that by adopting the existing rules of the racing and trotting conferences and the 
Greyhound Association and in affirming but restricting their powers to make rules , 
the legislature had imposed a material measure of control over the rule making 
powers of those bodies to such an extent that no longer were their rule making 
powers unaffected by the Act. He concluded that the rule making power of a New 
Zealand Racing Conference was made pursuant to a power or right conferred by "any 
act" namely the Racing Act 1971 , and therefore came within the definition of a 
statutory power. 
In Simpson that the Court was concerned to bring the decision exercised by the appeal 
judges under the definition of "statutory power" and "statutory power of decision". 
The Court was not conducting an enquiry into whether the decision of the Appeal 
Judges was in general terms one capable of review at common law . 47 
If Section 4 is read according to its plain and ordinary meaning , a prospective litigant 
must not only show that the decision maker has exercised a statutory or corporate 
power but must also show that he or she would be entitled to relief under one of the 
prerogative writs or by way of declaration or injunction. The Court may then by 
order grant that specific relief to which the litigant is entitled . If this interpretation 
is correct then the substantive grounds for judicial review are unaltered by the Act. 
46 Above n 45 , 7 . 
47 The common law prerogative writs and equitable remedies of injunction and declara tion have been retained 
in the High Court Rules. Procedurally they remain important as an alternative mechanism fo r rev iew. 
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Claimants may use the procedure in order to obtain a remedy in the nature of 
mandamus, prohibition or certiorari if they would be entitled to that remedy at 
common law. In addition claimants may use the procedure in order to obtain a 
remedy by way of declaration or injunction. For instance, if they had such a right 
under contract or under the principle of unreasonable interference with the right to 
work. However, incorporation alone would not entitle the prospective litigant to a 
remedy. The types of decision for which a claimant might claim relief under the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 would be restricted to the same grounds for review 
which are available at common law. 
The above view is supported by the decision of the full court of the High Court in Re 
Royal Commission on Thomas Case which stated that the intention of the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972 (as amended) was not to widen the grounds on which the Court 
could grant relief, but to extend the nature of relief that could be granted once those 
grounds were established, and to improve the procedure by which that relief could 
be obtained. 48 Taylor appears to have taken the view that incorporated societies may 
be reviewed under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 without more .49 This view 
appears to find support amongst the profession and the High Court. 50 It is, with 
respect, doubtful that this view will stand up to critical scrutiny. As yet there has 
been no clear articulation on the exact scope of Section 4 of the Act or for that matter 
of the amenability of decisions made by sports administrators to judicial review . 
There is indirect support for the view that Section 4 of the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972 has procedural and not substantive effect in the Court of Appeal decision 
Finnigan v NZRFU (No. 1). 51 In that case, club members who were not in a 
contractual relationship with the NZRFU sought a declaration that a purported 
48 [1980] 1 NZLR 602 ,615, 616. 
49 D G S Taylor Judicial Review (Butterworths Wellington) 1991) 6. 
50 See below, Part III C, 2. 
51 [1985] 2 NZLR 159. 
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decision of the Union to accept an invitation for the national team to tour South 
Africa was invalid on the grounds that it was against the objects of the Union' s 
constitution and an injunction to restrain the Union from implementing the decision. 
The Court of Appeal dealt with the issue as one of standing and therefore side-stepped 
the issue of scope. The Court made it clear that it was not holding or even discussing 
whether the decision of the NZRFU was the exercise of a statutory power. 52 The 
NZRFU was an incorporated society. Section 7 of the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972 provides that the Court may treat proceedings for a declaration or injunction 
which relate to a statutory power as if they were an application for review under the 
Act. If incorporation itself had been sufficient to attract the traditional remedies 
under the prerogative writs then there was no reason why the Court of Appeal could 
not have dealt with the case in this way. 
It is also worthy of note that in Waitakere City Council Fisher J rejected the 
submission that the Waitemata Electricity Shareholders Society which was an 
incorporated society would be subject to non-contractual public law grounds. He 
said: 
It is undoubtedly the case that in limited c ircumstances some non-contractual 
public law grounds can be invoked against a voluntary or commercial 
organisation, for example where the organisation is public ly owned and its 
decisions in the public interest could adversely affect the rights and liabilities 
o f private individuals without other fo rm of redress ... where it exerc ises quasi-
public functions . . . and (perhaps) where its decision could have signi ficant 
direct impact upon the public... The list could never be closed but I do not 
think that this case fa lls into one of those three specific instances. 53 
It is therefore unlikely that incorporation of itself will be sufficient to attract the 
remedies under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The exact scope of judicial 
review at common law is discussed in detail in Part IV of the paper. In New Zealand 
a number of cases have come before the Courts where the claimant has sought judicial 
52 Above n 51 , 179 . 
53 Above n 36 , 14, His Honour cited as authority Mercwy Energy Ltd v Electricity C01poration of New Zealand 
Ltd f 1994] 2 NZLR 385, R v Panel 011 Takeovers & Mergers, exp Dataji11 [1 987] 1 QB 8 15 and Finnigan v NZRFU 
No. 1 [1985] 2 NZ LR 18 1. 
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review of decisions made by sporting bodies and their constituent committees or 
tribunals. What is of note is that affected persons in the sporting arena have chosen 
in the main to challenge decisions on the grounds of judicial review rather than on 
grounds of breach of contract or unreasonable interference with a right to work. 
A singular feature of these cases is that the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the matter 
and apply the traditional grounds of judicial review have rarely been challenged. It 
appears that both plaintiffs and defendants accept the view that incorporation is of 
itself sufficient to attract the remedies of the prerogative writs. This may also 
indicate that the action by way of judicial review is more convenient and suitable to 
the types of administrative decision being made by sports associations and accepted 
by plaintiffs and defendants alike. The advantages of judicial review is that it is 
speedy, remedies are supervisory and relief is discretionary. 
C. An Examination of the New Zealand Cases 
1. The racing cases 
Since the decision in Simpson, members of the racing industry have regularly applied 
to the Court for judicial review of decisions made by the racing and trotting 
conferences or the committees and tribunals constituted under their respective rules . 
Applicants typically include trainers, jockeys, owners and member clubs . The vast 
majority of applications, concern decisions made by disciplinary tribunals . The Court 
of Appeal has entertained applications for review of the powers and decisions of the 
various decision making bodies in the racing industry without comment as to 
jurisdiction. 54 
In the racing cases the Courts have been willing to intervene under all the traditional 
grounds for judicial review. The cases illustrate the number of ways in which 
decision making bodies constituted under the rules of the racing conferences and the 
racing clubs can affect participants in the sport of racing. For example in Kerr v 
54 For example New Zealand Trotting Conference v Ryan (1990) 1 NZLR 143 . 
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Frampton & Ors , 55 the decision of the judicial committee finding a trainer guilty of 
corrupt practices and disqualifying him for six months was quashed by Hansen J and 
was sent back to the committee for a proper determination in the terms of the 
judgment. His Honour had found that the initial charges were bad for duplicity and 
therefore in breach of the requirements of natural justice and that the committee had 
wrongly interpreted the relevant rules as it did not have jurisdiction to hear one of the 
charges. The case is typical of the grounds upon which decisions of the racing 
conference will normally be impugned and illustrates that decisions of disciplinary 
tribunals can have a major affect on a person's livelihood. 
Owners whose livelihood is arguably not at stake have also sought judicial review of 
decisions made by racing clubs. In Naden v Judicial Committee of the Auckland 
Racing Club56 the plaintiff owners were unsuccessful in obtaining orders directing 
that the Appeal Judges reconsider their decision not to review further evidence . It 
is worthy of note that although owners livelihoods may not strictly speaking be at 
stake, a disqualification or relegation of their horse might deprive them of substantial 
pnze money. 
The decision of Johnson v The Appeal Judges appointed by the President of the New 
Zealand Racing Conference57 provides an example of the enormous affect a 
disciplinary tribunal of a sports association can have on the livelihood of participants . 
Johnson sought judicial review of the Appeal Judges' decision to overrule earlier 
decisions of two disciplinary tribunals lower in the hierarchy in which they substituted 
a finding of reckless riding for one of foul riding . The charge of foul riding carried 
a mandatory disqualification from riding for six months . He appealed on the 
grounds , inter alia that the appeal judges misdirected themselves as to the Jaw in 
55 Unreported , 13 May 1996 , High Court , Christchurch Reg istry, CP190/95 , see also Gillespie v Cunningham, 
Unreported , 16 August 1993 , High Court , Christchurch Reg istry, CP374/90, where Tipping J obse rved that a person 
alleged to be bound by the rules was entitled to have the rules obse rved and it was the duty of the Court to ensure 
that public and domestic tribunals remain on their "jurisdictional ra ils". 
56 [1995] l NZLR 307. 
57 Unreported , 3 May 1996, lligh Court , Wellington Reg istry , CPJ00/96. 
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finding there was a lack of reasons given at an earlier hearing of the District 
Committee when in fact reasons were given and that they failed to give him an 
opportunity to be heard in respect of all relevant matters concerning penalty. 
Gallen J pointed out at the beginning of his judgment that disciplinary decisions made 
within a sport are basically decisions for the administrators of that sport who are 
contemplated as being appropriate by the rules that govern the sport. His Honour 
commented that such administrators have the expertise which is appropriate for 
dealing with disputed questions of facts and they have the knowledge which allows 
them to come to conclusions where there is some dispute as to what may have 
occurred . However he also noted that disciplinary action of the kind under 
consideration fell within the category where the rules of natural justice apply. He 
pointed that the Courts would ensure that those rules were taken into account to 
ensure that the hearing was conducted in an appropriate and fair way . 58 
The Court rejected the plaintiff's claims that Appeal Judges had made an error in law 
but upheld his claim that there had been a breach of natural justice. No opportunity 
had been given to the plaintiff to make specific submissions as to penalty at the 
hearing. The decision on penalty was accordingly set aside and remitted to the 
Appeal Judges in order to give the plaintiff the opportunity to make such submissions . 
Johnson appealed to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the appeal judges had 
substituted their own judgement on the facts without paying proper regard to the 
decision of the stewards at first instance and to the District Committee who had heard 
oral evidence from the jockeys involved .59 The Appeal Judges relied on the 
transcripts of evidence below and the video films of the race. It was the plaintiff' s 
contention that the appeal judges should have given weight to the findings of the 
lower tribunals who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence first hand . 
58 Above n 57 , 6. 
59 Johnson v The Appeal Judges Appointed by the President of the New Zealand Racing Conference, 
Unreported , 16 July 1996, Court of Appeal, CAI 17/96 . 
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Keith J delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal and held that the appeal judges 
were entitled to rely on the video evidence in reaching their decision. The learned 
judge conceded that there was room for distortion in films but noted that they were 
assuming a greater importance in sporting disputes. He noted that the Appeal Judges 
were able to see the action recorded as it occurred and not as "filtered through the 
memories and words of witnesses and then recorded on the printed page. "60 
The Johnson decisions provide a number of useful insights into the role of judicial 
review as a tool for challenging the decisions of tribunals set up under sports 
associations. Firstly they illustrate the reluctance of the Court to interfere with a 
sports disciplinary tribunal's decision where factual issues are involved. This will be 
especially so where findings of fact require specialist knowledge. In addition the 
cases provide an indication of the increasing importance which video footage will 
have in decisions of sports disciplinary tribunals. Such evidence is typically unique 
to sports. As discussed above a fundamental characteristic of sports is the physical 
element. This action can readily be recorded on video and will provide a wealth of 
evidence which will not be available to disciplinary tribunals in other spheres. 
However there could be a danger in over-reliance on video evidence. Film is one-
dimensional and will not show the depth which is required in order to obtain a true 
perception of events. An attempt to relegate eye witness accounts and evidence from 
the participants themselves to a secondary role should be resisted. 61 
On a different note, the Johnson cases also indicate that the Courts will readily 
intervene by way of judicial review in decisions of disciplinary bodies of sports 
associations where issues of natural justice and procedural fairness are involved. 
However the requirement to observe the rules of natural justice will not necessarily 
60 Above n 59, 6. 
61 See Naden v Judicial Committee of the Auckland Racing Club, Unreported, 22 April 1994, High Court, 
Auckland Registry M 1414/93 where the plaintiff sought judicial review of the appeal judges refusal to admit evidence 
of two jockeys which they claimed would have shown that the judicial committee's conclusions were based on an 
optical illusion. The point is also illustrated in the newspaper article "Here' s elbow affair - you be the judge" Sunday 
- Star Times, New Zealand, 25 August 1996. A photograph shows Johnson leaning out of his saddle and impeding 
the jockey next to him. Unrecognised by the article writer is the double image of Johnson and his horse in the 
photograph resulting in a distinct lack of clarity. 
LAW L1BfV 'Y 
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- 24 -
result in decisions which may seem unduly harsh. When submissions were finally 
made as to penalty the Appeal Judges stood by the six month disqualification. 
Although Johnson finished the season as leading jockey he was in effect unable to 
earn his livelihood for a period of six months. This was despite the fact that he had 
completed over 760 rides for the season. 
The Courts have also been willing to intervene by way of judicial review on the 
grounds of unreasonableness. In New Zealand Trotting Conference v Ryan, 62 the 
Court of Appeal considered whether a rule under the New Zealand Rules of Trotting 
were manifestly unreasonable. The rule in question provided for the named body or 
person constituted to hear the matter under the rules to be able to deem an act 
fraudulent or corrupt or detrimental to the interests of trotting. The Court of Appeal 
held that it was implicit that the named body or person must act rationally and 
reasonably in reaching its conclusion. 63 
The racing cases provide a number of illustrations of how judicial review might 
operate in the sphere of sports administration. The Courts have been willing to 
intervene on all the general grounds for judicial review. On a number of occasions 
the various bodies constituted under the conferences' rules have acted outside their 
jurisdiction or unfairly. The conferences exercise effective monopolies over their 
sphere of activity and their decisions have the potential to affect a number of 
participant's livelihoods, rights to prize-money and right to participate generally. 
Judicial review appears to provide much needed protection for participants without 
unduly penalising the administering associations 
2. Judicial review of other sports associations 
There have been a number of recent cases where the High Court has allowed litigants 
to question decisions of sports associations by way of judicial review outside the 
62 I 1990] 1 NZLR 143. 
63 Above n 62, 149. 
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racing industry. In each case discussed in this section, application for review was 
sought under Part I of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. In the main both 
plaintiffs and defendants have accepted that the common law grounds for judicial 
review have been available once it has been established that the association in 
question is a body corporate. Decisions of associations have been impugned on 
grounds of illegality, procedural impropriety and unreasonableness. 
An example of where a sports association has acted outside its powers occurred in 
The Lower Hutt City Association Football & Sports Club Inc v New Zealand Football 
Association Inc. 64 The applicant which was a club member of the New Zealand 
Football Association challenged by way of judicial review a decision of the Football 
Association which it purportedly made under its rules. The club had earlier 
successfully challenged the Football Association's decision to relegate its top team to 
the third division of the Central League through the internal mechanism of appeal 
under the NZFA rules. The Central League was not happy with the decision. The 
Football Association therefore referred both parties to arbitration . The Club argued 
that the Football Association's decision to refer the matter to arbitration was illegal. 
Anderson J found as a matter of interpretation of the rules that the Football 
Association's decision to refer the matter to arbitration was indeed invalid and granted 
a declaration that the participation of the Club's team in the premier division of the 
Central League, found to be appropriate by the judicial committee and endorsed by 
the Council, should be upheld. Clearly the decision was the right one as the Football 
Association had attempted to rely on a technicality in order to avoid implementation 
of the judicial committee's decision. 
Similarly in Otahuhu Rovers Rugby League Club Inc & Ors v Auckland Rugby League 
Inc three Auckland Rugby League clubs sought to question the validity of a decision 
of the Auckland Rugby League Inc which controlled the game of rugby league within 
64 Unreported , 13 March 1993 , High Court, Auckland Registry , M335 /93 . 
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the Auckland district. 65 The clubs questioned the legality of Auckland Rugby 
League's directive to them that they display Lion Red (New Zealand Breweries) 
insignia on their goal post bolsters and corner flags . The three clubs were sponsored 
by Dominion Breweries. 
Williams J found that the ARL directive was reasonably necessary to implement the 
agreement it had made with Lion Breweries and to carry out the broad objectives as 
delineated in its constitution. 66 The clubs were bound by the constitution by reason 
of their affiliation to the ARL. Therefore the ARL had acted within its powers . Both 
Lower Hutt City Association Football and Otahuhu Rovers Rugby League illustrate the 
conflicts that can arise between a governing body and its member associations. It is 
clear the Courts will require that governing sports associations act within the powers 
conferred by their constitution. It is also of note that in each case focused on 
illegality and could have been equally decided under the principles of contract. 
Judicial review has also been allowed to question the decision of a disciplinary 
tribunal constituted under the rules of a sports association on a number of occasions . 
One such case arose when a front row forward for the South African rugby team who 
toured New Zealand in 1994 questioned a disciplinary ruling of the New Zealand 
Rugby Football Union. 67 During the second international between New Zealand and 
South Africa , La Roux, in what he later described as "a moment of madness ", bit the 
ear of the New Zealand hooker. A judicial committee constituted under the tour 
agreement between the two national bodies heard the complaint against La Roux and 
suspended him from all rugby for eighteen months . He appealed the decision to an 
appeal committee on the ground that the penalty imposed was excessive in all the 
circumstances and having regard to those imposed in other cases . The appeal was 
dismissed . 
65 Unreported , 12 November 1993, High Court , Auckl and Reg istry, M8 18/93. 
66 Above n 65 , 20 . 
67 La Roux v New Zealand Rugby Football Union, Unreported , 14 March 1995 , High Court , Wellingto n 
Reg istry, CP 346/94. 
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La Roux then applied to have the decision of the Appeal Committee set aside by way 
of judicial review under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The grounds upon 
which review was sought were, inter alia, that the Committee took into account 
irrelevant considerations, failed to take into account relevant considerations, and 
reached a decision that no reasonable appeals committee would have made. 68 
Eichelbaum CJ found that the major issue was one of the appropriateness of the 
length of the penalty imposed upon the plaintiff. He commented that one could 
understand that the penalty seemed high but concluded that the penalty was within 
reasonable limits. It is significant that His Honour imported the notion of 
proportionality into his decision as to whether the penalty was reasonable, and 
approved of the term "grossly disproportionate" used by Tipping Jin Isaac. 69 
The La Roux decision is significant for although the Court took into account the fact 
that the decision-maker was a domestic tribunal it was willing to examine the decision 
on grounds of unreasonableness. However, the decision of the Appeal Committee in 
La Roux seems unduly harsh when compared with Loe v NZRFU70 where Loe was 
suspended from playing for six months by a disciplinary committee after he was 
found guilty of eye-gouging an opponent during the final of a National Provincial 
Rugby Championship. 
Both cases were widely televised and the NZRFU was concerned about the image of 
the game and wished to send out a message to players by imposing a penalty which 
would act as a deterrent to foul play. Now that Rugby is fully professional there will 
be pressure on the NZRFU to balance the detrimental effects foul play have for the 
image of the game and the consequential affects on sponsorship with the enormous 
effect a suspension will have on the livelihood of the disciplined player, especially in 
light of their near monopolistic position. The doctrine of proportionality might 
usefully in the future be employed by the Courts in this area. 
68 Above n 67, 3. 
69 Above n 67, 14. 
70 Unreported, 10 August 1993, High Court, Wellington Reg istry , CP209/93. 
- 28 -
As discussed in the racing cases the Courts have made it clear that they will not 
countenance a breach of the principles of natural justice on the part of sports 
associations. In Coleman v Thoroughbred & Classic Car Owners' Club Inc & Or7 1 
Coleman had been placed in each of the first five of a six race series conducted by 
the defendant. The car club refused to allow Coleman to present an entry form for 
the sixth race . The club considered Coleman to have been overly aggressive with the 
officials in earlier races. Hammond J noted that the car club had provisions in its 
code for disciplinary matters but had not used them. He stated: 72 "It is simply 
unacceptable for significant sporting bodies to come into Court and say , we have an 
absolute right to deal with this plaintiff as we see fit. .. " The learned judge concluded 
that the acts of the car club in sending out entry forms for the first five races gave 
rise to a legitimate expectation that he would be entitled to compete . He held this 
expectation could rise equally by the operation of equity or judicial review. An order 
was made by the Court that the club allow Coleman to compete in the remaining race . 
The case illustrates that judicial review may be used not just to ensure that a decision 
is made fairly but also to ensure that a fair outcome is achieved . 
However the Court will not intervene in what are basically decisions of the referee . 
As Doogue J dryly observed in Tracey v The Speedway Control Board of New 
Zealand Inc: 73 "In these proceedings the applicant in effect seeks the assistance of 
this Court to be awarded the New Zealand Midget Car Championship for 1986. " 
The plaintiff had sought to challenge the decision of the referee to disqualify him 
from a particular race . His Honour refused to make findings of fact and dismissed 
the plaintiff' s application for judicial review . 
In both the racing industry and in other sports applications for judicial review of 
decisions made by sports associations are on the increase . It is significant that a 
7 1 Unreported , 13 May 1993, Iligh Court , Auckland Reg istry, M670/93. 
72 Above n7 l , 14 . 
73 Unreported 3 February 1988, High Court , Hamil ton Reg istry, Al 79/86, 1, see also Chamberlain v Speedway 
Co111ro/ Board of New Zealand Inc Unreported , 22 September 1992, High Court , New Plymouth Reg istry , CP2 l /92. 
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number of decisions recently challenged have involved a commercial element. The 
participation of the Lower Hutt City Association Football and Sports Club's top team 
in the premier division of the Central League would have had undoubted sponsorship 
implications. Moreover Otahuhu Rovers Rugby League Club was in effect a 
demarcation dispute between two sports sponsors. The La Roux case was decided on 
the eve of rugby turning professional. One of the grounds upon which Loe relied 
when questioning the length of his suspension was the loss of playing opportunities 
in the northern hemisphere where players are traditionally remunerated. While in 
Tracey and Chamberlain prize money and potential sponsorship were at stake. 
However, the loss of livelihood or property is not essential as Coleman clearly 
demonstrates, but even in that case, the plaintiff hoped to become a professional 
driver in the future. It is therefore not surprising that where suspensions and 
sanctions can have a major affect on a participant's livelihood or property rights that 
avenues for relief will be sought in the Courts. As professionalisation and 
commercialisation of sports continues it is likely that there will be increasing claims 
by participants by way of action for judicial review. 
In considering the cases discussed in this section it is important to note that many of 
the cases discussed above were brought at short notice as plaintiffs have sought urgent 
relief because of the impending sports fixtures. There has been a lack of time for 
reasoned arguments and considered reflection. Ostensibly the High Court have 
accepted that corporatisation is sufficient to found an action in judicial review under 
the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The debate in other jurisdictions has in the 
main focused on the susceptibility of decisions of sports associations to judicial review 
and the position in New Zealand remains unclear. A clear articulation of the law in 
New Zealand in therefore required. 
IV. CIRCUMSTANCES 
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WHICH WILL RENDER 
ASSOCIATIONS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
A. The Scope of Judicial Review in New Zealand 
SPORTS 
In New Zealand there are a number of examples where the Courts have used the 
instrument of judicial review to supervise decisions made by sports associations and 
various bodies formed under the association's rules. The issue which has arisen in 
the jurisdictions discussed below have been directed towards whether a particular 
sports association is in fact subject to review. A comparison with other common law 
jurisdictions must necessarily focus upon the scope of judicial review in the sporting 
arena. In New Zealand, outside the racing industry, there has been no clear 
articulation as to the exact scope of judicial review in relation to sports associations. 
There are a number of indications from the New Zealand Courts that they will be 
willing to take a wide approach in relation to the amenability of sports associations 
to judicial review. Although the Court of Appeal decision in Finnigan No. l 
considered the issue of the standing of the plaintiffs to bring an action against the 
New Zealand Rugby Football Union rather than as an issue of the amenability of the 
Union's decision to judicial review, the case provides support for a wider view as to 
scope and the type of decisions which may in fact be impugned. 74 
The Court of Appeal's decision was delivered by Cooke P. He conceded that there 
were no direct contracts between the plaintiffs and the New Zealand Union but 
stated: 75 
In cases where an incorporated association is alleged to have acted against its 
objects but the plaintiff can not show a contract, we think that all the 
74 For support for this view see Michael J Beloff "Pitch, Pool, Rink , ... Court? Judicial review in the Sporting 
World?" (1987] Public Law 1995 , 108, Jean Warburton "Sporting decisions: should the Courts participate?" [1987] 
131, 868, 869. 
75 
Above n 51, 178. 
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circumstances have to be considered - case by case or category of case by 
category of case - in order to determine as a question or mixed law and fact 
whether or not he or she has sufficient standing. 
In reaching its decision as to standing the Court of Appeal considered the following 
matters: although the plaintiffs did not have a direct contract with the Union, they 
were as club players linked to it by a chain of contracts. The issue of whether the 
Union was acting against its objects of promoting, fostering and developing the game 
of rugby was not only a matter of internal management but went to fundamentals. 
The decision challenged was probably as important as any other in the history of the 
game in New Zealand. The decision affected the New Zealand community as a 
whole and so relations with the community and those associated with the sport. 
While technically a private and voluntary sporting association, the rugby union was 
in relation to the decision in question, in a position of major national importance. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that unless persons such as the plaintiff were 
accorded standing the reality would be that there was not effective way of establishing 
whether or not the Union was acting within its lawful powers. As a result the 
plaintiffs would be left without a legal remedy. 76 
The value of Finnigan No 1 as an indication as to the scope of judicial review 1s 
limited by the fact that the issue was one of standing rather than of jurisdiction and 
because of the unusual factual matrix in which the decision occurred. Baragwanath 
has suggested that the Court of Appeal decision as a judgment in private law is 
correct but he has expressed concerns in relation to the public law propositions in the 
decision. 77 He points out that most of the considerations taken into account by the 
Court of Appeal may go to discretion to grant or refuse declaratory or injunctive 
relief once standing has been established but can not be sought in aid of standing 
unless those considerations are treated as the characterisation of the cause of action 
into public law. A number of commentators would have argued that this is indeed 
the effect of the decisions. 
76 Above n 51, 178, 179. 
77 David Baragwanath "The Tour " (1985) NZLS 22 l , 226, 227. 
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Pannick has said that the case is important as indicating a broadening of the scope of 
judicial review. He cites the public importance of the decision and the importance 
of the decision to the sport itself as factors which will found a claim to judicial 
review. 78Beloff has added that Finnigan No 1 supports the proposition that courts 
will review private bodies with monopolistic or near monopolistic powers over a 
sport. 79 
Later when the decision was returned to the High Court Casey J found that the 
plaintiffs had established a strong prima facie case that the decision to tour would be 
ultra vires the objects of the Union and issued an interim injunction preventing the 
team from leaving New Zealand until the substantive action was heard. 80 He came 
to the conclusion that because of the nature of the decision and the elements of great 
public interest including the effects the decision would have on New Zealand's 
relationships with the outside world and the community at large that the NZRFU must 
also act reasonably as well as honestly, and must pay regard to relevant 
considerations for the benefit of New Zealand rugby and must not be influenced by 
irrelevant considerations in its decisions. 
Baragwanath comments that it is a long step to treat the New Zealand Rugby Football 
Union as being generally subject to civil public law remedies and thus lose a private 
body's constitutional entitlement to act unreasonably including the obligation to take 
into account relevant considerations and disregard irrelevant matters. He has doubted 
whether Finnigan (No. 2) will survive future scrutiny without qualification. 81 
Despite Baragwanath's assertion it is unlikely that sports associations will, at least in 
the future, have an unfettered discretion to act unreasonably. Baragwanath cited 
78 Above n 41, 32. 
79 Above n 74, 108 ,109. 
8° Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc (NZ) (No 2) [1985] 2 ZLR 181. 
81 Above n 36, 186. Compare the comments of Fisher J in Waitakere City Council v Waitemata Electricity 
Shareholders Society Inc, unreported, High Court, 18 March I 996, Auckland registry, M 1524/95. See also: 
Hammersmith CBC v Secretwy of State for Environment [ 1990] WLR, 898, 962 where the House of Lords have held 
that irrelevant and relevant considerations will come under the ground of illegality. 
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Shepherd v SA Amateur Football League82 but in that case Cox J was careful to 
point out that the plaintiff was not arguing an implied term of reasonableness. 
Given the uniqueness of the circumstances surrounding the decision of the NZFRU 
and the time constraints under which the judiciary was operating the precedent value 
of the two cases will be limited .83 In Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football 
Union Inc (No. 3) Cooke P confirmed that the precedent value of the line of cases 
would be limited as they arose from a combination of circumstances which were most 
unlikely to be repeated. However he went on to say that no sharp distinction exists 
in New Zealand between public and private law due to the operation of the definition 
of a statutory power of decision in the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 (as amended) 
which includes powers to make certain decisions by or under the constitutional rules 
of any body corporate. 84 
The Privy Council has held that a state owned enterprise which is a company limited 
by shares is in principle a public body . 85 The Privy Council advised that as the 
body was established by statute and its shares were held by Ministers it was obliged 
to carry out its business in the interests of the public . They advised that its decisions 
may adversely affect the rights and liabilities of private individuals without affording 
them any redress . Their Lordships took the view that decisions of the corporation in 
question were in principle amenable to judicial review either under the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972 or under the common law. The New Zealand High Court has 
followed this reasoning to hold decisions of a Regional Health Authority86 and a 
82 (1986) 44 SASR 579 , 585. 
83 See for discussion: Simon L Wall "Finnigan - NZRFU Judicial handling of politica l controversy" (199 l) 2, 
YUWLR 147. 
84 [1985] 2 NZLR 190, 198. 
85 Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corp of NZ, Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385, 388 . 
86 New Zealand Private Hospitals Association & Ors v Northern Regional Health Authority unreported , 
7 December 1994, Auckland Reg istry , CP440/94 . 
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Crown Health Enterprise87 as being subject to judicial review. The above three 
cases lend authority to the proposition that bodies which are ostensibly private will 
be subject to judicial review where the source of their power is governmental but may 
also support a wider view that decisions which must be made in the public interest 
will be subject to judicial review. 
The New Zealand cases both reported and unreported, indicate that the Courts will 
be willing to take a wider view of the amenability of sports associations to judicial 
review. Where the source of the body's power is governmental then it will in 
principle be amenable to judicial review. 88However the source of power will not be 
the sole test. The Court of Appeal have in Finnigan and Stininato89 adopted a wide 
view of administrative law. 
B. A Comparison With Judicial Review of Sports Associations in Other .Jurisdictions 
The general consensus in other common law jurisdictions has been that sports 
associations are voluntary bodies into which the public law remedy of judicial review 
can not intrude. The leading case in England is R v Disciplinary Committee of the 
Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan. 90 The Aga Khan sought leave to apply for judicial 
review of a decision of the disciplinary committee of the Jockey Club to disqualify 
his horse and fine his trainer under the rules of racing. The substantive complaint 
was based upon the ground that the Committee's proceedings were unfair. The 
preliminary point at issue was whether the jockey club was a body which was 
susceptible to judicial review. 
87 Napier City Council v Health Care Hawkes Bay Ltd & Ors, unreported , 15 December 1994, Napier Reg istry, 
CP29/94 . 
88 Th e West Coast Regional Council v The Atlorney General & Ors unreported, 20 December 1994 , High 
Court , Wellington Registry , CP376/94 . 
89 Above n 51, n 38. 
90 [1993] 2 All ER 853 . 
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The Court of Appeal found that although the jockey club was created by royal 
prerogative and it exercised broad and monopolistic powers over a significant national 
activity it was not in its origin, its history, its constitution or its membership a public 
body. The Court cited the decision of R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 
ex p Lane91 and applied the dictum of Lord Parker CJ who had said although the 
exact limits of the remedy by way of certiorari had never been specifically defined, 
private or domestic tribunals have always been outside the scope of certiorari since 
their authority is derived solely from contract. In this respect the Court of Appeal 
followed its earlier decision in Law v National Greyhound Racing Club Limited91 
where the plaintiff trainer sought a declaration that a six month suspension of his 
training licence imposed by the stewards breached the club's rules of racing. The 
Court of Appeal held on that occasion that the plaintiff's licence as a trainer derived 
solely from a contract between him and the defendants and therefore the application 
for a declaration had been made on the correct basis of contract. 
It is of note that the Court of Appeal in Aga Khan was careful to leave the door open 
as to whether a sporting association could ever be susceptible to judicial review . 
Bingham MR noted that for the purposes of the appeal it was unnecessary to 
decide. 93 Farquharson LJ went further and stated that he could not discount the 
possibility that in some special circumstances the remedy might lie. He gave as an 
example if "The jockey club failed to fulfil its obligations under the charter by 
making discriminatory rules, it may be that those affected would have a remedy in 
public law". 94 The Court of Appeal concluded that in any event if the defendant 
acted unfairly then the plaintiff could proceed by way of writ seeking a declaration 
or an injunction on the basis of contract. 
91 (1967] 2 All ER 770. 
92 (19831 3 All ER 300. 
93 Above 11 90 , 867. 
94 Above 11 90, 873. 
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In Finnigan No 1 the trial judge Davison CJ noted that counsel were unable to find 
any reported decision relating to an incorporated society in New Zealand or to any 
other voluntary association in England, Australia or Canada where the Courts had 
intervened in the affairs of a society at the suit of a person who was not at the time 
a member or whose right to work was not affected. 95 That is no longer the case 
in Australia. The Victorian Supreme Court has held that the Administrative Law Act 
1978 (Vic) did not extend the jurisdiction of the Court to allow its review of a 
decision made by the Committee of the Victoria Racing Club . Beach J held the 
Victoria racing Club was a private body and its committee functioned as a private 
domestic tribunal whose jurisdiction was founded on contract and not on a statutory 
basis . 96 However , the same court found that stewards constituted under the Harness 
Racing Board were subject to judicial review where current legislation had intervened 
to II clothe the Board with authority 11 • 97 
In Canada the question of whether a sports association is subject to judicial review 
does not appear to have arisen . The Supreme Court of British Columbia has held that 
the disciplining of the two members by the Real Estate Board an incorporated society , 
was not subject to judicial review. 98 Bouck J held that the board ' s relationship with 
its members was contractual and not statutory. Therefore the procedure for judicial 
review could not be used . However , Bouck J decided the matter on pure technical 
grounds under the relevant legislation. No arguments were put forward concerning 
the public nature of the decision . By way of contrast in Vander Zalm v British 
Columbia (A cting Commissioner of Conflict of lnterest)99 Esn CJSC was prepared 
to assume , without deciding , that the principles of R v Panel on Takeovers and 
95 Above n 51, 17 1. 
96 Vowell v Steele [1985] VR1 33. See also Shepherd v South Australian Amateur Football leage Inc (1986) 44 
SASR 579 , where Cox J expressed similar sentiments. 
97 Pullicino v Osborne [1990] YR 88 1, 886. 
98 Ireland v Victoria Real Estate Board [1 987] 12 BCLR (2ed) 97, see also Mohr v Vancouver, New 
Westminster & Fraser Valley District Council of Carpenters (1988] 32 BCLR (2 ed) 104. 
99 [1991] 56 BCLR 37 , 43 . 
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Mergers, exp Datafin100 would apply to the law of British Columbia. In addition 
the Supreme Court of Canada has shown a willingness to import the principles of 
natural justice into the rules of the Articles of Association of a voluntary association 
where there are contractual rights . 101 
In the United States the head basketball coach of the University of Nevada, a state 
institution, brought the fairness enforcement procedures of the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association under the scrutiny of the Supreme Court. However, despite the 
virtual monopoly of the NCAA over Collegiate Athletics the Supreme Court held, in 
a 5-4 decision, that the NCAA was not required to comply with due process as it was 
not a state actor for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 102 Tarkanian had 
been found guilty by the NCAA of violations against its rules and in effect directed 
the university to suspend Tarkanian or face penalties. Tarkanian himself, faced 
demotion and a drastic cut in pay . Tarkanian issued proceedings claiming that the 
NCAA had deprived him of liberty and property without due process. 
The case turned on an examination of the source of the power to dismiss Tarkanian . 
All the judges agreed that a private body would be subject to judicial review where 
the State "enhanced the power of the harm causing individual actor." 103 The 
majority found that no de facto authority had been conferred on the NCAA by the 
State whereas the minority held that by acting jointly with the University which was 
a state institution the NCAA had become a state actor. At the root of the ministry 's 
concerns was the monopolistic powers the NCAA wielded for which Tarkanian, who 
was not in a contractual relation to the NCAA had no remedy . 
100 [1987] 1 QB 815 where the English Court of Appeal held that dec isions of private bodies could be subj ec t 
to judic ial review if there was a sufficient public element. 
101 Lakeside Colony of H11tteria11 Brethren v Hof er (1992) 97 DLR (4d) 16 . 
102 NCAA v Tarkanian 488 US 179 (1988). 
103 Above n 102, 485. 
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Tarkanian, Ireland and Vowell illustrate the technical difficulty that may ensue in 
bringing a private body's decision under the definition of the appropriate statute. It 
is clear that in the USA, Australia and perhaps Canada sports associations will be 
subject to review if there is sufficient governmental intervention . 
The above decisions may be compared with the status of sports associations m 
Scotland. In West v Secretary of State for Scotland104 the Court of Session held that 
the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court could be invoked to regulate the process by 
which decisions were taken by any person or body to whom a jurisdiction, power or 
authority had been delegated or entrusted by statute, agreement or any other 
instrument. The Court held that the competency of the application did not depend 
upon any distinction between public and private law . 105 
C. A Possible Wider View 
After the ground-breaking decision in Datafin 106 the way was open for a wider 
approach as to the scope of judicial review on the part of the Courts. In that case the 
Court of Appeal held that the supervision of the Court by way of judicial review 
would extend to administrative decisions of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 
despite the fact that the Panel was an unincorporated association . The Court of 
Appeal found that the Panel was operating as an integral part of the Government 
framework for the regulation of financial activity in the City of London and was 
supported by a periphery of statutory powers and penalties . As the Panel performed 
public law duties , was supported by public law sanctions and was under an obligation 
to act judicially the Court unanimously held that the Panel was amenable to judicial 
review .107 
104 1992 SL T 636. See also St Johnstone Football Club Ltd v Scouislz Football Association Ltd 1965 SL T 171 . 
105 Above 11 104, 650 . 
106 Above n 100. 
107 Above 11 100. 
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Donaldson MR reviewed the cases where judicial review had been granted and stated 
that the only essential ingredient which would render a body susceptible to judicial 
review would be a public element which could take many different forms. However 
he excluded bodies whose sole source of power was a consensual submission to its 
jurisdiction. 108 Similarly Lloyd LJ rejected the notion that the source of the power 
is the sole test as to whether a body is subject to judicial review. He commented that 
it would be helpful to look not just at the source of the power but at the nature of the 
power being exercised. He said: 109 
... if the body in question is exercising public law functions, or if the exercise 
of its functions have public law consequences, then they may, ... be sufficient 
to bring the body within the reach of judicial review. 
As Datafin was decided after Law it was open to the Court of Appeal in Aga Khan 
to find that the Jockey Club because of its public importance and monopolistic powers 
was a body which was susceptible to judicial review. However there has been a 
successive narrowing of the decision in Datafin in subsequent cases where plaintiffs 
have sought judicial review of decisions made by sports associations. 110 
In R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club exp Massingberd-Mundy 111 the 
applicant sought judicial review of a decision made by a disciplinary committee under 
the defendants rules that his name be removed from the list of those qualified to act 
as chairman of a panel of local stewards. He contended that the disciplinary 
committee had failed to follow the principles of natural justice. The Court held that 
the decisions of the Jockey Club and its disciplinary committee were not decisions 
within the sphere of public Jaw since the proceedings before the stewards were 
108 Above n 100, 838. 
109 Above n 100, 847. 
110 Richard Gordon and Craig Barbourt "Falling at the Last Fence" ( 1993) NLJ 158. 
111 [1993] 2 All ER 207. 
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domestic proceedings and the source of the power was a consensual submission to the 
jurisdiction. 
The Court added the rider that even if the Jockey Club as capable of being reviewed 
the decision in question did not have any public element about it and relief would in 
any event have been refused as a matter of discretion. Significantly however both 
judges stated in obiter that if they were not bound by the authority in Law they might 
have been disposed to conclude that some of the decisions of the Jockey Club were 
capable of being reviewed by the process of judicial review . 11 2 
The divisional court reached a similar decision in R v Jockey Club, ex p RAM 
Racecourses. 113 The applicants who were racecourse developers sought judicial 
review of the Jockey Club's decision not to allocate any fixtures to the applicant's 
new racecourse. The applicant contended that a report issued by the Jockey Club had 
raised a legitimate expectation that it would grant a minimum number of fixtures for 
its new racecourse. The divisional court held on the substantive issue that the 
applicant could not rely on the report as raising a legitimate expectation. As to the 
amenability of the Jockey Club to judicial review both judges stated that if it were not 
for existing authority to the contrary that a decision of the Jockey Club relating to the 
allocation of fixtures would be susceptible to judicial review . Simon Brown J stated 
that the Jockey Club's function in regulating racecourses and allocating fixtures bore 
a striking resemblance to the exercise of a statutory licensing power. He held that 
when the Jockey Club was exercising a quasi-licensing power he would regard it as 
subject to judicial review. 11 4 
112 Above 11 111, 219, 222 . 
113 [1993] 2 All ER 225. 
114 
Above 11 113,248. 
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The subject of judicial review of sports associations again came into question in R v 
Football Association, ex p Football League. 115 Rose J held that the Football 
Association despite its virtual monopolistic powers and the importance of its decisions 
to many members of the public was a domestic body whose powers arose from and 
duties existed in private law only. Therefore it was not a body susceptible to judicial 
review. He said that to apply the principles honed for the control of the abusive 
power by government and its creatures to the governing body of football would 
"involve what, in today's fashionable parlance, would be called a quantum leap". 11 6 
However he did not exclude the possibility that sports associations would always be 
exempt from the purview of judicial review. He stated that each case would turn on 
the particular circumstances. Ram Racecourses provides a clue as to the types of 
decisions which might be subject to judicial review while Massingberd Mundy 
illustrates that the Courts have an overriding discretion to refuse a remedy if there is 
an insufficient public interest. In addition despite the conceptual problems highlighted 
in the Football Association case the door is open for the adoption of a wider view. 
D. The Way Ahead 
At first glance it would appear that other common law jurisdictions have decided that 
judicial review will not be available to impugn decisions of sports associations. 
However, on closer examination the way of open for further development. In England 
judicial review may be available where there is no alternative remedy or where there 
is a sufficient governmental interest. Likewise in Australia , Canada and the US 
judicial review may be available in relation to decisions made by sports bodies if they 
carry out government functions . 11 7 It is clear from the cases that there is a tension 
between the demarcation of what may be termed public law and private law. 
11 5 [1993] 2 All ER 833 . 
11 6 Above 11 115, 899 . 
117 Above 11 97 , 11 99 , 11 l 02. 
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In New Zealand although the Court of Appeal or for that matter the Privy Council 
has not provided a definitive statement as to when a sports association may be subject 
to judicial review, a number of factors which the Court will look at in deciding 
whether judicial review is available can be gleaned from the cases. 
The most prominent characteristic which the Courts have focused on has been to 
examine the nature of the body in question and ask whether the source of power is 
consensual. It was this factor which led the Court of Appeal in Aga Khan to 
conclude that the Jockey Club was not subject to judicial review. On the other side 
of the coin the Court will look at whether the body has been woven into any system 
of governmental control as was the case in Datafin. A related test is the implied 
devolution of power or but for test. The Court will ask itself a hypothetical question 
of whether parliament would legislate in relation to the power being exercised if the 
body in question was not there. 118 The Courts will examine the role fulfilled by the 
person or body whose act or decision has been called into question in deciding this 
factor. It will enquire as to whether a person or body has a monopolistic or near 
monopolistic power in an area in which the public have an interest, whether the body 
holds a position of major national importance and whether the particular function 
which the person or body is performing affects the applicants rights in a way which 
is peculiar to him or her. 11 9 Also of importance will be whether the decision is of 
major importance to the sport and whether the association is obliged to act in the 
public interest. 120 
It is significant that of all the abovementioned factors the consensual submission to 
jurisdiction of the body exercising the power has often been determinative. 12 1 This 
approach was criticised by Simon Brown LJ in a situation where the body in question 
11 8 R v Chief Rabbi, ex p Waclzmann [1993] 2 All ER 249 . 
11 9 Above 11 Ill, per Neill LJ 221. 
120 Above 11 51, 11 85. 
121 Above 1190 , 11 96 , 11 98, 11 102. 
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exercises monopolistic powers and the person has in reality no choice but to accept 
the jurisdiction of the decision-maker. 122 It is noteworthy that in Dataftn Donaldson 
MR excluded bodies where there had been a consensual submission to jurisdiction. 
It is clear that as the law stands in England those who have a contactual relationship 
with the decision-maker will not be able to call upon judicial review in order to 
examine the decision of a sports association. It is noteworthy however that the cases 
have left open the possibility of judicial review being available to impugn a decision 
made by a sports association where there is no contract between the parties. In Ram 
Racecourses Simon Brown LJ said: 123 
... the nature of the power being exercised by the Jockey Club in discharging 
its functions of regulating racecourses and allocating fixtures is strikingly akin 
to the exercise of a statutory licensing power. I have no difficulty in regarding 
this function as one of a public law body, giving rise to public law 
consequences. On any view it seems to have strikingly close affinities with 
those sorts of decision-making that commonly are accepted as reviewable by the 
Courts. 
In his view where a body holds a monopolistic power in an important field of public 
life and those affected by the decision did not voluntarily or willingly subscribe to the 
decision-makers rules or procedures then decisions which have an essentially public 
character should be subject to judicial review . 
Despite the dicta in Massingberd Mundy and Ram Racecourses the English Courts 
have adopted a narrow approach as regards the amenability of sports associations to 
judicial review. If there is a contract between the decision-maker and the affected 
person then judicial review will not be available. If however there is no contract 
between the decision-maker and the affected person and the decision has a sufficient 
public element such as a licensing function or involves the making of discriminatory 
rules then decisions of sports associations may be subject to review. 124 
122 Above n 113 , 246, 247. 
123 Above n 113, 24. 
124 Above n 90, 873, n 113 , 245. 
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Gordon and Barlow have criticised the narrow approach taken in England. As they 
rightly point out the availability of an alternative remedy goes to discretion and not 
jurisdiction. 125 Aldous and Adler 126 have also criticised the narrow approach. 
They argue that is seems artificial and unnecessary to require evidence of government 
intervention where powerful associations ascribe regulatory powers for public 
purposes and affect people who have no contractual link with the association. They 
also argue that the distinction between contractual and con-contractual powers is 
artificial. 
Similar sentiments have been echoed by Hammond J in Coleman where he stated: 127 
... even if we were not dealing with an unincorporated society which I have 
already held is subject to the Judicature Amendment Act provisions quite 
independent of that consideration the first defendant at least in these 
proceedings may well be reachable by a more extensive principle of natural 
justice based on legitimate expectations. 
Such a notion causes traditional private lawyers and commercial organisations to recoil 
in horror, and the standard reply is always, what about the sanctity of private 
arrangements? The reply to that in turn is in that the twentieth century courts have found 
it appropriate to ameliorate the worst excesses of the nineteenth century. 
Further given the comments of Cooke P in Finnigan No. 3 128 it could be argued that 
the New Zealand situation is more analogous to that of Scotland where there is no 
sharp distinction between public and private law. 129 
Given the comments of Simon Brown J in Ram Racecourses it is possible that but for 
the availability of contract that judicial review would be available to examine 
disciplinary proceedings of the Jockey Club and other sports associations with 
125 
Above n 110, 159. 
126 Grahame Aldous and John Adler Applications for Judicial Review (2ed, Butterworths, London, 1993). 
127 Above n 71, 14. 
128 
Above 11 84. 
129 
Above 11 104. 
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monopoly powers. This would especially be so if the decision involved a quasi-
licensing function such as the ability of trainers, owners and jockeys to participate. 
Given the precedent of the racing cases in New Zealand where licenceholders are in 
a contractual relationship with the conferences a New Zealand Court is likely to be 
willing to scrutinise the decision of a disciplinary tribunal, constituted under a sports 
association by way of judicial review whether or not there was a contract between the 
parties. 
The question arises as to whether judicial review will only be available were an 
affected person's livelihood or property is at stake. Such an approach finds support 
from Breen and the dictum of Simon Brown J in Ram Racecourses. In Lower Hutt 
City Association Football and Otahuhu Rovers Rugby League the member clubs rights 
could be said to have been infringed. In Lower Hutt City Association Football the 
member club's rights under the Football Association's rules to participate in the top 
division of a central league had been unlawfully interfered with by the governing 
body. In Otahuhu Rovers Rugby League the member club's right to property in 
sponsorship was alleged to have been unlawfully appropriated by the governing body. 
Similarly in Loe the plaintiff's suspension had a severe impact on his livelihood. 
While in Tracey the plaintiff's disqualification resulted in a loss of prize money and 
sponsorship. Similarly in the racing cases a jockey or trainers will be affected by 
suspension. 
However, in La Roux and Coleman the plaintiffs were competing in amateur events 
and yet the Court was on each occasion willing to impugn the decision by way of 
judicial review in order to determine whether principles of natural justice had been 
followed. This may be indicative of a wider view in New Zealand that freedom and 
opportunity to compete is also a consideration. 130 
The real distinction between the New Zealand and English cases seems to revolve 
around the existence of a contract between the parties. If Gordon and Barlow are 
130 Above n 38, 13, n 71 . 
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correct then this consideration should not affect the question of whether the sports 
association is subject to review or whether the decision in question has a sufficient 
public element to attract judicial review. Only at the third stage when considering 
whether as a matter of discretion to grant judicial review should the question of 
contract arise. Such an approach would be in accordance with the cases in New 
Zealand. 
V. THE COMMERCIALISATION OF SPORT 
As mentioned above the sports and leisure industry contributes significantly to the 
economy and its commercial aspect can not be denied . Sports is being increasingly 
recognised for its entertainment value which has resulted in the encroachment of both 
the media and commercial interests into sport. The stage has now been reached 
where a number of football clubs in England have publicly listed on the stock 
exchange. 131 In the United States sport as a purely entertainment business has 
already taken hold in the upper levels of most major sports . 132 Grayson has pointed 
out that sport now exists at two different levels. At the top level, where it often 
exists as a commercial entertainment, it is divorced "in spirit, attitudes and ethics 
from its grass roots , school , club and village green levels" . 133 
Hargreaves explains that there is also a divergence at the top level of sport itself. 
Some sporting activity is organised as a profit maximising business enterprise. 
However, while a good proportion of organised sports is highly commercialised the 
majority do not operate on this basis , their objective being to break even or to operate 
at least at cost in order to remain financially viable . He points out since the late 
1950' s sponsorship , advertising and TV money has become an increasingly important 
revenue for cash strapped sports associations . As a result the owners and controllers 
131 See "The lure of the public company" Mercantile Gazette: Business Christchurch , New Zealand , 29 April 
1996. 
132 Burton F Brody "My World with Sport " NDLR (1 991 ) 67 , 259 . 
133 See above n 3 , viii. 
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of sports organisations and the sports elite treat the audience increasingly as 
consumers and "power and control is passing out of the hands of the traditionalist 
amateur interests and into those of an efficiency and publicity-conscious, more 
business-oriented group of sports administrators." 134 
In Hargreaves' view this has resulted in the larger and better organised interests 
clashing with the smaller weaker ones. For instance, sponsorship may exacerbate 
problems of division between the top and bottom levels of sport as there is no 
guarantee that the additional resources will in fact trickle down to the lower levels. 
He concludes that sports have now entered into a world where they can never be 
secure as the more reliant they become on commercial interests the more opportunity 
there is for the corporate sponsor to enforce conditions. He gives examples of 
changes made in the rules of national sports in order to attract investment from 
sponsors and the media. The points which Hargreaves makes illustrate the additional 
pressure under which administrators will operate as sports become more commercial. 
The availability of judicial review will act as an added safeguard against such 
pressure. 
The requirement to produce revenue for an association may also put pressure on the 
athletes to sacrifice athletic values in the interests of entertainment and profit. Brody 
commenting on the situation in the United States has likened professional sports 
franchises to the railway robber barons of an earlier day. He argues: 
Concentrated focus on profit makes athletic competition subservient to its ability 
to produce income. Sportsmanship, fair play and team work are pushed to the 
background. Athletes and athletic ability have no worth beyond the ability to 
generate revenue. Professional sports have more to do with American 
corporate culture and its desire to be part of major events than they have to do 
with anything related to athletics and athleticism. 135 
134 Above n 6, 114, 117. 
135 
Above n 132, 259. 
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Commenting on the bureaucracy of the NCAA he has warned that the costs involved 
in sport providing for commercial entertainment may be the sport itself. 
The racing industry provides a good example of the complex nature of commercial 
involvement in sport. At one level the Racing Conferences and member racing clubs 
are ostensibly non-profitmaking but rely heavily on grants from the commercially 
driven Racing Industry Board and on sponsorship. The object of the blood stock 
industry and the totalisator betting agency on the other hand is to maximise profits . 
Some indication of the magnitude of the industry is shown by the Racing Industry 
Board ' s total revenue for 1995 which was over $88 ,000,000.00 while total stake 
money paid out was close to $50,000,000 .00 . 136 In addition the industry provides 
a livelihood for jockeys, trainers and a host of other participants including owners , 
veterinary surgeons and horsebreeders. The Johnson case gives a clear example of 
how a disciplinary tribunal can have an enormous effect on a sports person ' s 
livelihood. 
An indication of how quickly some sports have moved into the commercial arena is 
provided by the example of the New Zealand Rugby Union. The sport has 
transferred overnight from an ostensibly amateur game controlled by a non-profit 
making association to a professional commercially packaged entertainment. Sanzar, 
the accord regarding television rights reached between the national unions of New 
Zealand , South Africa and Australia is expected to see US$555 million flow into 
rugby over the next ten years. 137 Players from provincial level upwards can expect 
to earn between $15 ,000.00 to $180,000.00 or more in one season . 138 
Baragwanath who has been critical of the decisions of the Finnigan cases has 
conceded that there is a general public interest in permitting all citizens to work 
136 New Zealand Rac ing Industry Board Annual Report 1995. 
137 New Zealand Rugby Union 1955 Annual Report. 
138 Nige l Stirling "Profess ional Rugby - Contracts fo r the All Blacks" Law/ink Magazine, New Zealand , 
November 1995, 8, 9 . 
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within their own area of qualification or experience. 139 The vast majority of cases 
brought by way of judicial review in the racing industry have concerned suspensions 
of jockeys or trainers under disciplinary mles which have a direct effect on their 
livelihood as the governing bodies have a monopoly on the activity. Judicial review 
proceedings will provide a valuable safeguard of those rights. 
Most of the non-racing cases in which judicial review has been sought to impugn the 
decisions of sporting associations have had a commercial aspect. As Williams J noted 
in Otahuhu Rover Rugby League that case reflected a "sea change" that had occurred 
in the last decade whereby amateur sporting activities have been gradually but steadily 
absorbed into the world of commerce. He characterised the dispute as ostensibly 
between the ARL and the clubs but in essence a demarcation dispute between two 
large commercial sponsors active in the sports entertainment business. 140 
The protection of member clubs against the governing body and the protection of the 
players themselves, against arbitrary decisions which may affect their livelihood, or 
discriminate against them or put them at risk will be important as commercial 
interests put pressure on sports administrators . For instance, suspensions, 
disqualifications which may be imposed and the consequential loss to players may be 
out of all proportion to the offence in order to satisfy sponsors as to the image of the 
game. Rules might be changed in order to render the sport more visually appealing 
which could put the players safety at risk or reduce the enjoyment factor in the game. 
It is likely that as sports become increasingly commercialised that there will be a 
greater demand for the judicial review procedure . This will in part be due to the 
effect which decisions of sports associations can have on the livelihood of players and 
other participants and the increased likelihood that governing bodies will conflict with 
clubs at the lower or grassroots level by sacrificing their interests in the interests of 
revenue from sponsorship and demands of the media. 
139 
Above 11 77, 226. 
140 Above 11 65, 2. 
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In principle decisions of sports associations and their constituent bodies will be 
subject to judicial review even if they form into limited liability companies. In each 
case the scope of judicial review will depend upon the nature of the decision in 
question. Where a decision concerns entering or determining a commercial contract 
to supply goods and services it is unlikely that the decision would be subject to 
judicial review in the absence of fraud, corruption or bad faith. 141 Clearly in 
Otahuhu Rover Rugby League the clubs could not have challenged the ARL's decision 
to contract with Lion Breweries. However, even when a purely commercial decision 
is being exercised the parent association may still have a duty to consult with member 
clubs and players. Such a duty would arise from the rules of the association142 or 
where the decision goes to the very heart of the association ' s undertaking. 143 In 
each case it will depend on whether the particular decision has a sufficient public 
element to warrant judicial review. 
VI. THE FUTURE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SPORTS 
ASSOCIATIONS - A CASE FOR REFORM? 
A. Legislative Reform 
The future role of judicial review as an instrument for impugning decisions of sports 
associations and the decisions of persons with delegated powers under the rules of 
such associations remains uncertain . In New Zealand , there have been an increasing 
number of cases where judicial review has been sought against decisions of sports 
associations. With the increasing commercialisation and professionalism in sports the 
demand for judicial review is likely to increase . A narrow approach as regards the 
scope of judicial review would result in judicial review being available only where 
141 n 85, 391. See also New Zealand Stock Exchange v Listed Companies Association Inc [19891 lNZLR 699, 
706, where the Court of Appea l held that the exercise of a right under contract was not a statutory power o f 
decision. 
142 n 86, 34 , 35 . 
143 
11 87 , 29. 
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there is no contract between the decision-maker , a sufficient level of governmental 
interest and the affected person has some property or vocational right at stake . 
However there is no certainty that even the narrow view will be accepted . 
Therefore , where for instance a sports association is in a monopolistic position in 
relation to a specific sport and the affected person is not a member of the association 
then that person may be left without a remedy . If their livelihood depended upon 
participation within the industry , some relief may be available under the doctrines of 
unreasonable restraint of trade or interference with a right to work. However the 
rights accorded to affected persons will be less than those grounds available under 
judicial review. The cases of Mclnnes v Onslow-Fane144 and Stininato demonstrate 
the difficulty that an applicant will have in proving that a sports association has in fact 
acted unfairly. 
All this raises the question of whether legislation should be introduced in order to 
provide protection for players and other participants against what might otherwise be 
uncontrolled regulatory power. Following the United States Supreme Court decision 
in Tarkanian several states and Congress initiated legislative action in response to the 
public perception that the NCAA's enforcement procedures did not afford due process 
to investigated parties. 145 Due process focuses on, inter alia, liberty and property . 
Liberty includes the right not to be deprived of freedom to engage in some significant 
area of human activity. 146 Therefore the rights under due process will be wider 
than the deprivation of livelihood and are likely to extend to reputation, honour, 
integrity and the right to participate in sport. Beloff indicates that it would take 
legislation to bring all "over-mighty subjects which are unarguably private within 
144 [1978] l WLR 1521. 
145 Robin J Green "Does the NCAA Play Fair? A Due Process Analysis of NCAA Enfo rcement Regulations" 
(1992] 42 DLJ 99 , 134, 135. 
146 
Above n 145, 106 
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judicial review's control". 147 The case for and against intervention are examined 
below. 
B. Points For and Against Judicial Review 
1. The public element in sport 
Sport is about fair play. It has as its cardinal principle, the Corinthian ideal that it 
is important not so much to have been victorious as to have taken part. The same 
standards should be required of associations governing sport. Grayson has made the 
comment that international and domestic sport has time and time again proven to be 
unfit to govern itself both on and off the field of play. 148 Jan Cameron claims that 
sport conveys messages which confirm the dominant ideas and values of society (for 
good or ill). She argues that sport helps reinforce these values and ideas . She gives 
as examples values such as the submission to authority, acquiesence to rules , the 
importance of co-operation, team work, competitive individualism and reward for 
work , patriotism and loyalty . 149 If it is accepted that sport plays this role in society 
then it is in the public interest that sports associations adhere to the same rules when 
making decisions affecting participants . The essence of sport is that participants must 
observe a set of rules and play fairly . Sport has a position of major public 
importance in New Zealand and , it is therefore in the public interest that associations 
governing sport act fairly. 150 
147 
Above n 26 , 147. 
148 
Above n 3 xxiii . 
149 Jan Cameron "The Soc iology of Sport " in Harvey C Perkins and Grant Cushman (eds) Leisure, Recreation 
and Tourism (Longman Paul Limited , Auckl and , 1993), 182. 
150 This principle has been recognised in the New Zealand Rugby Union' s Rules fo r Discip linary Hearings (2nd 
Rev ised ed , NZRFU, 1994) "Failure to implement and apply the rules according to the ir tenor and intent will not 
only undermine the integrity of the disciplinary regime itself but will also bring the game into disrepute." 
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2. An onerous burden on the courts 
One argument against allowing judicial review of decisions made by sports 
associations is that it would place an unnecessary burden on the Courts. Rose J in 
Football Association exp Football League stated that if judicial review were applied 
to the governing bodies of sports associations there would be a misapplication of 
increasingly scarce judicial sources. 151 Beloff argues that such an argument has 
little intellectually to commend it and pragmatically is usually shown to be ill-
founded. 152 This argument has much force. Many players and participants will be 
in a contractual relationship with the governing body and others will have an action 
under the doctrine of interference with the right to work. Such litigants could apply 
for injunctive relief in any event. This however has not resulted in disgruntled 
litigants descending on the Courts like the hordes of some fabulous Khan. Nor 
should the sanction of the Court in awarding costs against an unsuccessful litigant be 
underestimated. 
In addition as Lord Justice Wolf has pointed out the procedure for judicial review has 
many benefits. 153 Proceedings do not become bogged down in discovery, the courts 
can provide relief with remarkable rapidity and the remedies are discretionary. It is 
noteworthy that in an action contract damages would be available and remedies are 
available as of right. 
3. An instrument to control the abuses of government misused? 
A stronger argument against the extension of judicial review concerns the conceptual 
strain that may result if it is extended to sports associations which are essentially 
voluntary and self-regulating. Rose J was of the view that such an extension of the 
principles honed for the control of the abuse of power by government would involve 
151 Above n 115, 949. 
152 Above n 74 , 100. 
153 Lord Justice Wolf "Judicial Review in the Commercial Arena " The Denning Lecture 1987 , 3 , 10 , 11. 
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a "quantum leap". 154 This argument has some force . The modern conceptual 
justification for judicial review is based on Dicey's view of administrative law. The 
ultra vires principle is directed towards assuring that administrative bodies do not 
exceed the powers which parliament has given them. 155 Craig points out that it is 
difficult to apply the ultra vires principle to non-statutory bodies as they do not derive 
their power from statute and therefore judicial review can not be rationalised through 
the idea that the Courts are delineating the ambit of parliament's intent. 156 
On the other hand, Black would argue that it is necessary to develop a non-unitary 
notion of "public" based on the understanding of the nature of self-regulating bodies 
as mediators between different systems of society, and not as mediators between the 
State and the individual. She contends that such an approach would allow for a 
flexible application of the principles of judicial review which would take into account 
the degrees of regulation, autonomy and the way in which they vary in different cases 
in relation to different functions or different decisions. She argues that such an 
approach would focus on the nature of the decision or action and ask whether that act 
or decision was public and not whether the body itself could be defined as public. 157 
Lord Woolf has extra judicially supported such a view based on the principles in 
Datafin which would in His Lordship ' s opinion provide protection for citizens against 
the activities of bodies performing public functions where there are no alternative 
remedies. 158 There is no doubt that these arguments go a good way to shortening 
the "quantum leap" and the conceptual strain becomes less apparent. 
154 Above n 115 , 849 . 
155 PP Craig Administrative Law (3ed, Sweet & Maxwell , London, 1994), 5 . 
156 Above n 155 , 15 . 
157 Above 11 4 , 52, 53 
158 Above 11 153, 12. 
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4. Sanctity of contract 
Closely allied to the conceptual argument is the argument that private bodies should 
not be subject to public law remedies. Such measures it is argued interfere with the 
liberty of the citizenry . It is this rationale which together with the conceptual 
argument underlies the reluctance of the Courts to impugn decisions by way of 
judicial review. 159 This is particularly so where the affected person has a remedy 
available in contract. However as Simon Brown J recognised in Ram Racecourses, 
where a sports association is in a virtual monopoly position there will in reality be no 
true consent. This principle was also recognised in Finnigan No 1. Black has argued 
that contract may be used as a means of control as well as a means of exchange. 160 
If it is recognised that judicial review will only be available where the sports 
association stands in the position of a virtual monopoly then the freedom of contract 
argument has much less force. 
5. Protection of livelihood and property 
When La Roux was banned from playing rugby for 18 months by the Appeal 
Committee of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union had judicial review not been 
available he may have been left without a remedy . Eichelbaum CJ accepted that the 
penalty seemed excessive. The Rugby Union had in mind when imposing the penalty 
the maintenance of the reputation of the game. If in the future when similar decisions 
are made with the loss of sponsorship in mind it will be important that such tribunals 
exercise their powers according to law and are not swayed by considerations not 
contemplated in the rules. Similarly in Johnson the six month suspension he received 
had an enormous effect in his earnings and ability to work. The commentators 
159 Sir William Wade "New Horizans in Administrative Law" Commonwealth Law Conference (Auckl and , 
1990). 
160 
See above n 4 . 
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unanimously support the availability of judicial review in situations where a person's 
livelihood or property is at stake and there is no alternative remedy. 161 
6. Sports should be in control of sports 
In Cowley v Heatley 162 Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC expressed the view that 
sports associations should not be unduly hampered in their work without good cause . 
The argument being that to impose the principles of judicial review on such a body 
places too onerous a burden on what are essentially voluntary organisations . This 
argument has some force when applied to local clubs or small sports associations . 
The view also has recognition in New Zealand where deference is paid to the fact that 
sports people are the best judges of the merits of a decision. In addition Wade points 
out that it is undesirable if sports associations and similar bodies become hidebound , 
creating a formalistic civil service mentality. 163 The argument has less force 
however when the sports association has a virtual monopoly on its sphere of activity 
and can affect the livelihood of those participating within its sphere. These arguments 
disregard the flexibility of judicial review as an instrument of intervention, further the 
Courts are well able to tailor their approach according to the nature of the body and 
the decision. The Courts also have an overriding discretion not to grant relief where 
breaches of the rules are technical or minor . 
7. The reflexes of sports associations 
Beloff has argued that the availability of judicial review to impugn decisions made by 
sports associations would tend to improve the standards of decision-making bodies in 
order to avoid the risk of intervention from the Courts. 164 This argument is borne 
16 1 Above n 159, n 113. 
162 (1996) The Times LR 24 July, 1986. 
163 Above n 159, 442 . 
164 Above n 74 , 100. 
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out with the recent changes to the racing judicial system under the Racing 
Amendment Act 1995 and the changes to the rules of the Racing Conference and 
Harness Racing New Zealand . The main thrust of the changes was to bring in an 
independent professional judiciary because of the perceived lack of independence and 
inadequacy of the previous judicial committee and appeal tribunal system. 165 
Judicial control of racing has been handed over to professional personnel. Many of 
the judicial review cases were used as training devices. 166 The Rugby Union has 
also recently revised its rules to dispense justice in a "fair , consistent, independent 
and expeditious manner". 167 These changes give a clear example of the benefits of 
the availability of judicial review to players and participants in sport. An awareness 
of the procedures for natural justice and a willingness to follow the rules will save 
costs for the industry and provide a fairer and more predictable system for the 
participants. The fair and efficient dispatch of disciplinary proceedings is likely to 
see a decrease in applications for judicial review to the High Court. 
8. The need for legislation 
As discussed above , the New Zealand courts seem to be taking a wider view of the 
scope of judicial review than other jurisdictions. Although legislation might be called 
for in England, in New Zealand the need is less obvious . It is likely , given that there 
is no clear distinction between public and private law in New Zealand , even at 
common law, where a participant's livelihood or property or indeed right to 
participate has been infringed , that judicial review will be available to supervise the 
decisions of sports associations . 
One of the goals of the Hillary Commission is to improve the organisational 
infrastructure and programme delivery systems for sport, fitness and leisure . While 
165 See "Charges Arising from the New Rules of Rac ing - Guidance Notes fo r Owners and Licenceholders" 
New Zealand Racing Calendar, Wellington, June 1996. 
166 See "Judge after 'younger fo lk ' fo r panels" The Sunday Star-Times, New Zealand , 5 May 1996. 
167 Above n 150. 
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one of its guiding principles is to foster the independence of national sport and 
recognise that "sport is in charge of sport". 168 The availability of the instrument 
of judicial review to supervise decisions made by sports associations and bodies 
formed under these rules will go a long way towards meeting those goals. The 
remedy is flexible enough to take account of the differing nature of sports associations 
and the different types of decisions which are made by them in order to ensure that 
sports associations are not unduly oppressed while ensuring fairness to participants. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In New Zealand, at least, it would appear that the instrument of judicial review will 
continue to be available to participants who wish to challenge decisions made by 
sports associations and their constituent bodies. This may be an indication that both 
plaintiffs and defendants find the procedure and remedies to be suitable and 
convenient. Convenience alone should not be a reason for allowing a tool which was 
developed to control the abuses of governmental power to intrude into what are 
ostensibly private organisations. However, the wider view adopted as to the scope 
of judicial review seems to be a recognition of the regulatory power which many 
sports associations administer. 
Doubt remains as to just how wide a view the New Zealand courts will adopt. This 
is indicative of the tension, which is also evident in other common law jurisdictions, 
between the recognition of the freedom to strike one's own bargains and the right to 
be free from interference by government on the one hand and a recognition of the 
enormous regulatory power which some domestic bodies do in fact have over 
participants. The courts are likely to intervene if they can find sufficient government 
intervention or perhaps a sufficient public element. 
The division between public and private law has not been fully recognised by the New 
Zealand courts. Sports associations can wield near monopolistic powers over a 
168 Hillary Commission Corporate Plan 1994-95 (Wellington 1994). 
- 59 -
specific sport which can affect the livelihood of participants and indeed the liberty of 
persons to participate in an important civic activity. Sports reinforce common values 
of society in general including the ideal of playing fairly and by the rules. Surely 
sports associations should be bound to follow these same rules and ideals. The public 
element of sports should not go unrecognised by the courts . Judicial review is an 
instrument which can adequately supervise the decisions made by sports associations 
and is flexible enough to ensure the speedy resolution of disputes without intruding 
too far into the decisions of the associations concerned . 
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